

I observe, however, that on the preceding page (p. 78) M. Mansion falls into an error, frequently committed by Aristotle, of speaking of "equal" but different numbers. Properly speaking, there are no such things. Every integer *B* which is not identical with an integer *A* is unequal to *A*, or, if you deny this, you will be, at any rate, driven to invent entities of which this principle holds, and to say that the class of these new entities, and not the class of "integers," when so defined as to permit of equal but non-identical members, is the object studied by elementary Arithmetic.

A. E. TAYLOR.

*A. Cournot, Métaphysicien de la Connaissance.* Par E. P. BOTTINELLI. Published by Hachette. Pp. xii, 286.

This work is an introduction to Cournot's philosophical views as developed in the *Essai* and the *Traité*. Cournot seems to me a very lucid writer, and an introduction is hardly necessary except to make him more widely known. M. Bottinelli gives a clear and full account of Cournot's more characteristic doctrines, but he refrains almost entirely from criticising them. Where he does criticise his conclusion is generally that it is Cournot's mode of expression rather than his thought that needs alteration.

An exception, however, must be made in connexion with Cournot's theory of objective chance, where M. Bottinelli holds that there is a genuine error. Cournot's position is that there is objective chance in the sense of mutual independence of laws even in the sphere of mathematics, and that there is objective chance in the sense of spontaneous and unpredictable beginnings in the spheres of history and life. Our author holds (a) that Cournot sometimes confused the two meanings and was at any rate liable to make too many concessions to a mechanical view which he actually rejected; and (b) that chance has no real meaning as applied to pure mathematics, since it depends essentially on unfulfilled possibilities, and there are none in this region.

In conclusion, I think that M. Bottinelli gives a more Bergsonian turn than is justifiable to some of Cournot's theories by his mode of expression; but it must be confessed that some passages that he quotes tend to support his interpretation.

The book contains a very full bibliography of works by and about Cournot.

C. D. BROAD.

*Die Logik als Aufgabe. Eine Studie über die Beziehung zwischen Phänomenologie und Logik. Zugleich eine Einleitung in die Ordnungslehre.* Dr. HANS DRIESCH. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1913. Pp. vi, 100. 2m. 40.

This volume is complementary to one published in 1912, entitled *Ordnungslehre*, in which Logic was regarded as based on the concept of order. In the fundamental truth of philosophy, "I think something," that which I think is to be regarded as essentially ordered; and in so far as I ask what makes my experience ordered, I am engaged in a logical investigation. But the question arises, How am I to know that something makes my experience an ordered one? Dogmatism on this question can only be avoided by starting from the standpoint of Phenomenology, which gives, as it were, the maximum of information with a minimum of presupposition.